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NO PLACE TO HIDE: WHY STATE AND FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF STALKING LAWS MAY BE THE BEST
WAY TO PROTECT ABORTION PROVIDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
"I think that if you live by the sword, you're going to die by the
sword."' This announcement, made by an anti-abortion protestor inter-
viewed on television, serves as a chilling example of a new attitude
surfacing in the divisive debates surrounding the bitter issue of abortion.
Once upon a time, the discussion was one of semantics and differing
ideologies. Once upon a time, the issue was whether or not a woman had
a right to obtain an abortion.2 Once upon a time, the game was played out
in courtrooms and was based on legal niceties. Times have changed though,
and abortion foes have rewritten the rules of the game. Now, discussion has
turned into threats and real episodes of physical violence.3 Now, the issue
is not whether a woman has a right to control her body; the issue is how
many abortion protestors a woman will have to fend off in order to get into
a clinic to exercise that right And now, the game is played out where
abortion providers and their families live,5 and wherever their employees
1. Nightline: Doctors Targets ofAnti-Abortion Threats (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 12, 1993)
[hereinafter Nightline].
2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. In 1991, abortion providers reported experiencing 95 incidents of violence, including
bombings, arson, assault, and vandalism. In 1992, 194 such incidences were reported. By 1993, the
number had risen to 434, including one murder and one attempted murder. NATIONAL ABORTION
FEDERATION, INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AND DIsRUPrION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS (1994) (on
file with author).
4. In 1990, 45 incidences of picketing occurred at abortion clinics and 1363 arrests took place.
In 1991, 292 incidences of picketing occurred at clinics and 3885 arrests took place. In 1992, 2898
incidences of picketing occurred and 2580 arrests took place. Finally, in 1993, 2279 incidences of
picketing at clinics occurred and 1236 arrests took place. Id.
5. Jeri Rasmussen, a women's health clinic owner, checks her car every day for vandalism and
her driveway for nails planted to destroy her tires. Chunks of concrete have been thrown through the
windows of her home with anti-abortion messages attached. Laura L. Sydell, The Right-to-Life
Rampage: Anti-Abortion Groups Step Up the Terror, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1993, at 24. See infra
notes 26-62 and accompanying text for examples of harassment of clinic doctors and employees.
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go.6 Today, abortion providers are considered "fair game."' Anti-abortion
groups such as Operation Rescue have declared war on providers,
promising them "No Place to Hide."' Militant abortion protestors raised the
stakes of the game, and now they are playing for keeps: the life of the
abortion provider.
Attempts to shield providers from intrusive and illegal action by
protestors have been made. In 1994, Congress enacted the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE),9 which established criminal and
civil penalties for use against anti-abortion protestors who block access to
abortion clinics. However, abortion providers generally agree that the Act
has failed to reduce incidences of violence at their clinics.' °
Recent judicial decisions also reflect concern for the safety of abortion
providers and patients. In 1993, in National Organization of Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler," the Supreme Court found in favor of the National Organiza-
tion for Women (NOW) in a civil suit against a coalition of anti-abortion
groups and refused to exempt abortion opponents from potential liability
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 2 This decision allows pro-choice groups to challenge anti-
abortion activities as patterns of racketeering activity and to seek substantial
monetary penalties. Scheidler's practical value will be limited, however, to
organizations such as NOW that can afford massive litigation costs; it will
not aid the individual abortion practitioner.
Each state also has a myriad of criminal statutes that prosecutors may
invoke to prosecute dangerous protestors,'3 Almost all of these statutes,
6. Patricia Windle is the owner of the Aware Women Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida.
Sydell, supra note 5, at 25. Recalling the harassment of her friends, family, and employees that has
gone on for much of her twenty years as an abortion provider, Windle recounted one instance as an
example. One day, Windle was called to an employee's house to comfort the employee's screaming
child; the child had been scared by an anti-abortion protestor who waited until the child's mother had
gone to work before coming to the door to harass the child. Id.
7. Minnesota: Free Speech Question Raised by Clinic Laws, American Political Network, June
10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993). JeffWhite, the Director of Operation
Rescue for California, originated the "No Place to Hide" campaign of harassment toward doctors
providing abortions. Id.
9. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248); see also S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993).
10. Peter Eisler, Abortion Providers Say New Law Does Not Protect Them, Gannett News Service,
Sept. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File.
11. National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
13. See infra Part III.C. for a discussion of these state statutes.
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however, require that the victim suffer some level of physical attack,
thereby leaving a victim unprotected from harassment short of physical
violence that a victim finds threatening. However, the use of statutes that
do not require a physical attack, such as harassment statutes, raises serious
constitutional difficulties. Despite this veritable cornucopia of existing
remedies to protect providers against abuse, attacks will continue. None of
the described remedies effectively protects abortion providers.
This Note advocates the use of state stalking statutes to prosecute
overzealous anti-abortion protestors and protect abortion providers. The
existence of stalking laws in almost every state14 presents a unique
opportunity to guard the safety of abortion providers, both at work and in
their private lives. State stalking statutes offer the most effective response
to the problems each individual provider faces. The statutes are tailored to
restrain both verbal and physical actions, and, thus, would prohibit the
harassment and residential picketing that many providers experience. 5
Further, most state stalking laws exempt legitimate protest 6 and are
narrowly drafted so as to resist constitutional challenge, 7 unlike other
available criminal statutes that target the same behavior. 8 Thus, stalking
laws already in place, rather than new and costly legislation, can be used
to stop violence by anti-abortion protestors.
More importantly, stalking laws provide immediate physical security to
the vulnerable doctor or clinician by authorizing courts to impose
restraining orders and harsh criminal sanctions on stalker-protestors. The
independent shelter of stalking laws legitimizes the victim's belief that she
is the target of a novel and virulent crime intended to wear down her
defenses.'9 In the abortion context, the protestor's intent is to get at the
"weak link"2 in the armor of abortion rights and force all abortion
providers to quit the system. This campaign of terrorism is working: anti-
14. See infra note 124 for a survey of state stalking laws.
15. See infra Part 1V.B. for a discussion of the range of behaviors proscribed by stalking statutes.
16. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-10-1 (1993) (providing that the definition of stalking "does not
include statutorily or constitutionally protected activity').
17. See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional challenges
to stalking laws.
18. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
19. See Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 819, 890 (1993) ("The victim's state of mind is an important component of many
anti-stalking laws.").
20. Randall Terry, President of Operation Rescue, see infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text,
has been quoted as stating that doctors are the "weak link" in the provision of abortion services, and
he has vowed to make doctors' lives "a living hell." H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 8, at 9.
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abortion protestors continue to endanger women's access to a constitution-
ally protected abortion as well as doctors' and clinicians' lives.
While state stalking statutes promise to be the most effective tool yet in
restraining the illegal activity of abortion protestors, some criticisms remain
concerning their use. First, while the restraining order 2' is the most
common remedy used in conjunction with state stalking laws,22 the
restraining order, often proves ineffective because it is simply ignored.23
Thus, the value of using stalking laws against abortion protestors is limited
by the order's enforceability. Second, even if state legislatures endorse the
use of stalking laws to prosecute anti-abortion protestors, local or state
police and courts may simply refuse to enforce those laws.24 Third,
stalking laws may face constitutional challenge.25 While these problems
may appear fatal, they can be overcome by careful drafting.
These criticisms, though valid in certain situations, do not substantially
reduce the overall effectiveness of using state stalking laws to protect
abortion providers, their families, and their patients. State stalking laws
remain the best, and the most narrowly tailored, means to prosecute anti-
abortion protestors who exceed the legal limits of protest.
II. THE CAMPAIGN TO END ACCESS TO ABORTION
While generalization is inherently dangerous, Operation Rescue stands
as a moderately mainstream example of the philosophies and organizational
21. A restraining order is a court-ordered injunction issued against a person who has harmed,
attempted to harm, or threatened to harm another, and is usually issued in an emergency situation.
McAnaney et al., supra note 19, at 876 n.281.
22. See Wayne E. Bradburn, Jr., Comment, Stalking Statutes: An Ineffective Legislative Remedy
for Rectifying Perceived Problems with Today's Injunction System, 19 011O N.U. L. REV. 271, 271,
273 (1992).
23. In Illinois, 35,346 order-of-protection violations were reported in a five-month period in 1992.
Id. at 876 n.280 (citing Linda Mae Caristone, Every Day May Be My Last, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 13, 1992,
at 3).
24. During large-scale anti-abortion protests in Wichita, Kansas, in 1991, the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas made specific findings that the city of Wichita displayed a "lack of zeal
... in defending the legal rights of the [abortion clinic] plaintiffs and their patients." Women's Health
Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D. Kan. 1991). When protestors gathered
in Missoula, Montana, local police refused to respond to a clinic invasion. S. REP. No. 117, supra note
9, at 19 (testimony of Willa Craig, Executive Director of the Blue Mountain Clinic in Missoula,
Montana, before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, May 12, 1993).
25. Most often, these challenges are based on the theory that a stalking law is too broad or too
vague, and thereby proscribes activities that the Constitution protects along with those which it does
not. The most frequent grounds for challenge include alleged violations of the rights of association and
of free speech. See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
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structure of today's anti-abortion alliance.26 Using Operation Rescue as a
model, this Part traces the current activities of America's anti-abortion
groups and the effects of those activities upon the availability of abortion
and upon those who provide abortion services.
Randall Terry founded Operation Rescue in 198827 and quickly moved
to originate a week of blockades at a New York City abortion clinic.2"
Terry and his followers adopted aggressive philosophies, instructing
activists to harass all comers to abortion clinics.29 Soon, mainstream
Christian leaders endorsed Operation Rescue's tactics,30 giving the group
both publicity and respectability.
As Operation Rescue's network spread, so did its notoriety. In 1989, the
National Organization for Women (NOW) successfully sued Operation
Rescue to enjoin the organization from obstructing abortion clinic
facilities.3' When members of Operation Rescue violated the injunction's
26. Well-known mainstream anti-abortion groups include Rescue America, Project Rescue, and
the Christian Defense Coalition. Other anti-abortion groups include the Pearson Foundation, Lambs of
Chnst, and Missionaries to the Preborn. See Nightline, supra note 1; Laura Griffin, Violence in the
Name of God, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at IA; H.R. REP. No. 106, supra note 8, at 4-5.
An example of a less mainstream anti-abortion organization is the Pearson Foundation, which
provides information and advice to Midwestern anti-abortion groups in order to assist them in setting
up anti-abortion counseling centers. The Foundation distributes video equipment, pamphlets, kits for
unne tests, and slide shows. The Foundation's modus operandi is to advertise its services in a neutral
manner, such as listing "Abortion Services" in the local Yellow Pages. Once women come to the clinic,
most are surprised to receive a lecture on the immorality of abortion and information only on
alternatives to it. Victims of such duplicity have sued these mock abortion clinics on a variety of claims:
for deceptive advertising, see Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North Texas, Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d
533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (enjoining the Pearson Foundation for violating Deceptive Trade Practices
Act), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989); for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Boes v.
Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); and for a civil rights conspiracy against a class of
women who decided to have an abortion, see Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, vacated
on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
27. See John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, Civil Rights and RICO: Stopping Operation Rescue,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 253-56 (1990) (discussing Operation Rescue's organization, strategies
and intent to stop abortions).
28. See Sara Diamond, Watch on the Right, THE HUMANIST, Sept. 1993, at 41; see also Nadine
Brozan, Effectiveness of Abortion Protests Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1988, at 28 (describing the
first organized effort by Operation Rescue to close down New York City's abortion clinics).
29. Diamond, supra note 28, at 41. Diamond cites Joseph Scheidler's pamphlet, Closed: 99 Ways
to Stop Abortion, as a seminal tract for the anti-abortion movement. Id.
30. Id. Diamond reported that some of the "Christian right" figures endorsing Operation Rescue
include Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, James Dobson, Beverly Lattaye, and Cardinal John J. O'Connor.
Id
31. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); see also National Org. for Women (NOW) v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1496-97 (E.D. Va. 1989), afl'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part
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prohibitions,32 Terry chose to close his main office in upstate New York
rather than pay the civil contempt penalty. While the resulting lack of a
geographical focus temporarily splintered Operation Rescue's support, a
grass-roots campaign emerged around the country.33 Between 1977 and
April 1993, over 8,000 clinic blockades and related disruptions were
reported. 4 A national survey in November 1993 showed that at least one-
fifth of the nation's abortion clinics had been the targets of violence that
year alone. 5
Operation Rescue's members vary widely in the level of their devotion
to the cause of stopping abortions.36 Their tactics vary just as widely,
ranging from passive picketing to physical invasions of clinics. One
common strategy used by the group is the human barricade.37 Typically,
dozens of persons-and in some cases hundreds or even thou-
sands-trespass onto clinic property and physically barricade entrances and
exits by sitting, lying down, or standing and interlocking their arms." This
ingenious approach, invented by Randall Terry, is called the "rescue" and
is defined in Operation Rescue's literature as the act of "physically
blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between
and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
32. Diamond, supra note 28, at 41; see New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.
Supp. 388, 393-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing the civil contempt penalties imposed on Operation
Rescue).
33. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300,301 (D.D.C. 1989). In a letter on Operation
Rescue letterhead, Randall Terry described "the growth of this movement": "On April 29th, the National
Day of Rescue II, rescue groups in 46 cities participated in rescue missions." For a description of
"rescues," see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
34. NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, supra note 3.
35. See Brookline Attacks Continue Rising Tide of Violence, REUTERS, Dec. 30, 1994 [hereinafter
Brookline Attacks], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File. USA Today, a popular daily
newspaper, reported the following results:
Percentage of abortion clinics experiencing violence from January to July 1993:
Death Threats 21.0%
Bomb Threats 18.1%
Blockades 16.0%
Stalkings 14.9%
Invasions 14.6%
Chemical attacks 10.3%
Arson 1.8%
Paul Leavitt & Mimi Hall, Abortion Defenders: Stop Clinic Terror, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 1993, at 3A
(citing as its source the Feminist Majority Foundation).
36. More militant groups, such as Pro-Life Virginia, have denounced Operation Rescue, calling
its members "wimps." Griffin, supra note 26, at IA.
37. For a further description of the human barricade technique, see S. REP. No. 117, supra note
9, at 7.
38. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss2/9
1995] STALKING LAWS: PROTECTING ABORTION PROVIDERS
abortionists and the innocent victims. '39 Often, however, these rescues
turn ugly as protestors invade the clinics themselves and physically attack
both the clinic's facilities ° and those who provide abortions."
The tide began to turn away from peaceful protest after the 1991
"Summer of Refuge"42 and 1992 "Spring of Life"'43 campaigns run by
39. Kelly Faglioni, Note, Balancing First Amendment Rights ofAbortion Protestors with the Rights
of Their "Victims," 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 362 n.9 (1991) (emphasis in original) (citing
National Org. for Women (NOW) v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488-90 (E.D. Va. 1989),
which in turn quoted Operation Rescue literature that defined "rescue" activities).
40. Abortion clinics have endured arson fires, bombings, and chemical attacks. These attacks have
not only endangered the lives of the women and providers present but also have had the unfortunate
result of severely limiting access to health care for women, especially those in rural areas. See infra
notes 72-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of such terrorism upon the availability
of abortion. One Senate report noted that "from January through May 1993, alone, three reported acts
of arson in Florida, Texas, and Montana caused over $1.5 million in damages" S. REP. No. 117, supra
note 9, at 5.
Anti-abortion protestors recently added a new tactic with which to vandalize abortion clinics:
chemical attacks. Since January 1992, 71 chemical attacks have occurred in at least 15 states, at a cost
of at least $500,000. Id. at 6. The chemical of choice is now butyric acid. The acid is poured through
holes in clinic walls, injected through locks and mail slots, slipped under doors, and left in bathrooms
by people entering the facilities posing as patients. Id. The acid "creates an intolerable stench and causes
nausea, vomiting, headaches, dizziness, inflamed eyes and skin, and difficulty in breathing." Id. After
butyric acid was sprayed through the mail slot of a Memphis clinic in May 1992, the clinic was forced
to close for two weeks and to discard all of its furnishings. Id. (citing Frank Fisher, Acid Attacks,
Associated Press, Mar. 3, 1993).
41. The National Abortion Federation reported that from 1977 to April 1993, more than 1,500 acts
of violence against providers of reproductive health services were reported in the United States. These
acts included at least 37 bombings, 87 arsons, 166 death threats, 88 assaults, two kidnappings, 345
clinic "invasions," and one murder. NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, supra note 3. Since that report,
four other murders have taken place. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
"Invasions" refer to another Operation Rescue technique that involves a number of anti-abortion
protestors storming and forcefully entering clinics that offer services to patients. See H.R. REP. No. 306,
supra note 8, at 7.
42. During the 1991 "Summer of Refuge" campaign, Operation Rescue repeatedly protested at
abortion clinics in Wichita, Kansas, among other cities designated as "Cities of Refuge." For two
months, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people came to Wichita from across the nation to engage in
activity including "'acts of trespass and obstruction' aimed at blocking access to the clinics." S. REP.
No. 117, supra note 9, at 9 (citing United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Kan. 1992)).
Operation Rescue succeeded in "virtually overwhelming the resources of the city's relatively small
police forces." Id. (quoting Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,265-
66 (D. Kan. 1991)). The six-week protest is estimated to have cost Wichita one million dollars and to
have led to over 2,741 arrests. Id. (citing NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, THE COST OF CLINIC
BLOCKADES (1993)).
43. Buffalo, New York, was chosen as the target for Operation Rescue's "Spring of Life" protests
in April 1992. Buffalo police arrested 605 blockaders protesting at city abortion clinics. The protests
cost the city over $380,000 during a two-week span of time. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 9. A
strong contingent of pro-choice "escorts"' and pro-choice protestors kept the clinics open. Diamond,
supra note 28, at 41.
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Operation Rescue. During the summer of 1993, Operation Rescue targeted
health care facilities in seven cities.' However, in most cities, the anti-
abortion protestors met strong resistance from pro-choice supporters,45
local police departments,46 and courts.47 As a result, the tactics of the
pro-life movement shifted away from large clinic blockades and towards
dissuading doctors from performing abortions.48
This shift in the pro-life movement's tactics has resulted in violence. On
March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn, a physician who performed abortions at
several clinics in northern Florida, was shot and killed during an anti-
abortion demonstration outside a health clinic in Pensacola, Florida.49
Prior to his death, Dr. Gunn had been followed, threatened, and harassed
for years.50 Abortion foes distributed "wanted" posters bearing his photo-
graph, home address, home telephone number, and daily work schedule.'
An anti-abortion activist was convicted of first-degree murder in the
case.
5 2
In August 1993, just months after Dr. Gunn's death, an anti-abortion
protestor shot Dr. George Tiller outside a Wichita, Kansas, women's health
44. Operation Rescue, Abortion Rights Activists Clash at Clinics, UPI, July 10, 1993 [hereinafter
Clash at Clinics], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
45. In Northern California, the Bay Area Coalition for Our Reproductive Rights (known as
BACORR) has sent teams of clinic defenders to meet Operation Rescue blockaders. Diamond, supra
note 28, at 42. Similar resistance met Operation Rescue's protests in Buffalo, New York, in the spring
of 1992. Id.
46. See James Risen, Giving Peace a Chance, L.A. TIMEs, July 19, 1993, at Al (detailing how
police readiness affects anti-abortion groups); see also Clash at Clinics, supra note 44 (describing many
arrests of anti-abortion protestors during Operation Rescue's campaign in the Summer of 1993); Mimi
Hall, Turnout Low for Abortion Protestors, USA TODAY, July 19, 1993, at 3A (comparing number of
arrests in Summer 1993 to those in 1991 Operation Rescue campaign).
47. In several cities subject to Operation Rescue's overwhelming protests, local courts and city
councils reacted in a manner similar to Judge Robert McGregor in Melbourne, Florida. Judge McGregor
ordered anti-abortion protestors to establish a 36-foot "buffer zone" around a local abortion clinic, citing
a local anti-stalking law as the basis for his decision. Amy Stevens, Stalking Law Cited, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 9, 1993, at B8.
48. "We may not get laws changed or be able to change people's minds, ... [b]ut if there is no
one willing to conduct abortions, there are no abortions," said the field director of Operation Rescue's
national organization. Sandra G. Boodman, The Death of Abortion Doctors, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
1993, at 27.
49. S. RP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 3.
50. Id. Gunn's son, David Jr., said that his father told him about being followed just days before
his death. Nightline, supra note 1.
51. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 4.
52. Charles Laurence, Murderer of Abortion Doctor Gets Life in Jail, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar.
7, 1994, at 10.
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care clinic. 3 The woman who shot Dr. Tiller testified at trial that the
abortion doctor had to be stopped "at all cost[s]."'54 Fortunately, Dr. Tiller
suffered only minor wounds in the arms. His attacker was sentenced to ten
years in prison for attempted murder.5
Pensacola was again the site of clinic violence in July 1994, when an
anti-abortion protestor shot and killed Dr. John Bayard Britton and his
escort, James Barrett.56 The two men were killed at a clinic that was just
down the road from the clinic at which Dr. Gunn was killed a year earlier.
June Barrett, who was also escorting Dr. Britton to the clinic (where he had
replaced Dr. Gunn), survived the shooting by playing dead in the back seat
of the truck in which the victims were shot. The attacker was convicted of
violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)
and was sentenced to life in prison. 7 Soon after, he was tried and
convicted in state court for both murder and attempted murder and was
sentenced to death. 8
Most recently, in December 1994, two clinic workers were killed and
five others were wounded when a man entered two neighboring women's
health care clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts and opened fire.59 The
attacker, John Salvi, has since been arraigned on both federal and state
charges. 60
Tragic as these shooting were, no one working in the women's health
care field was surprised." Both police and pro-choice organizations
believe that other shootings of abortion providers have occurred because of
the providers' occupations, even though no conclusive evidence of this
theory exists.62
53. Griffin, supra note 26, at IA.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Brooldine Attacks Continue, supra note 35.
59. Id.
60. Christopher Daley, Suspect in Clinic Shooting Denies U.S. Charges, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1995,
at A3. Massachusetts law does not allow the death penalty, thus, the most severe sentence Salvi could
receive is life in prison. Id.
61. After the shooting of Dr. Gurn, Ron Fitzimmons, the Executive Director of the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers, said, "People kept saying, 'I'm sorry it was David, but I knew it was
going to happen."' Sydell, supra note 5, at 27.
62. See Brookline Attacks, supra note 35. A Canadian gynecologist was seriously wounded in
November 1994 when he was shot through the window of his home while eating breakfast. Id. The
Vancouver doctor had been the target of anti-abortion protests in the past, and the provincial
government is focusing its investigation on the anti-abortion movement, Id.
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In response to the shootings, measures are being taken to protect
providers. The Department of Justice recently opened an investigation into
whether a nationwide conspiracy exists among militant anti-abortion
groups.63 Abortion providers are also increasing their personal level of
protection. Many providers wear bulletproof vests;' others install bullet-
proof glass for protection. 6 Jeri Rasmussen, owner of a women's health
clinic providing both abortion and other health services, checks her car
muffler every morning for a pipe bomb.66
Along with this threat of violence, abortion providers suffer various
forms of harassment. Protestors make distrubing telephone calls, 67 picket
providers' homes," display "wanted" posters plastered with providers'
personal information,69 employ high-powered microphones to listen to
conversations inside clinics,7" and pressure providers through their friends,
family, and neighbors.7' The surreal has become real life for abortion
In the United States, several doctors who worked at women's health care clinics have been attacked
or violently killed in recent years. Often these crimes are attributed to other motives, such as robbery,
but the pro-choice establishment suspects a conspiracy to murder abortion providers. Griffin, supra note
26, at IA. Suspicious incidents have occurred in Mobile, Alabama, Houston, Texas, and Los Angeles.
Id.
63. Attorney General Janet Reno created a "permanent task force" at the Department of Justice
after the shootings in Pensacola, Florida. Brookline Clinic Slayings, American Political Network, Jan.
9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File. As of yet, "no hard evidence that major
right-to-life groups have directed or financed the rash of clinic attacks" has surfaced. Id.
64. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 17.
65. Id. The cost of a truly protective security system for a women's health care clinic now runs
from $15,000 to $25,000. Brookline Clinic Slayings, supra note 63.
66. Sydell, supra note 5, at 24.
67. Dr. Norman Tompkins, whose private obstetrics and gynecological practice includes the
provision of abortions, receives countless threatening phone calls at home. One message on his
answering machine said, "I'm going to cut your wife's liver out and make you eat it. Then I'm going
to cut your head off." S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 10.
68. Katherine Welsh, the executive director of a women's health center in Minnesota, sued the
abortion foes who repeatedly picketed her home and obtained a two-year restraining order. See Welsh
v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Minn. Ct App. 1993).
69. Dr. Pablo Rodriquez, the Medical Director of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, is the
subject of a "wanted" poster, much like the one that featured Dr. Gunn, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 10-11.
70. Anti-abortion protestor Meredith Raney admits that his organization uses a high-powered
surveillance microphone, capable of listening to conversations hundreds of feet away and through
windows, to listen to clinic workers talking to their coworkers. Sydell, supra note 5, at 27.
71. "Do you know you live next door to a murderer?" asked an anonymous abortion foe who
called the neighbor of an abortion provider at 2:00 a.m. Id.
Anti-abortion activists have been known to pressure the families of abortion providers as well.
Louise Luck, the wife of a physician who performs abortions, momentarily left the hospital bedside of
her elderly, ailing mother. When she returned, she found that protesters had sneaked in and hung rosary
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providers.
Considering the violence and harassment endured by abortion providers,
it is not surprising that the number of providers has declined.72 Statistics
show that only seventeen percent of the counties in the United States
presently have an abortion provider.73 Some doctors have responded to the
attacks by vowing, despite long hours and relatively unrewarding pay, to
continue the work that they believe to be moral, legal, and important.74
However, the American Medical Association recently warned Congress that
the adequacy of health care may be endangered by the abortion protestors'
violent activities.75
Even if providers are willing to endure the violence and harassment,
abortion clinics may nonetheless be forced to close. Insurance companies
currently holding property and liability policies on abortion clinics are
beads on her unconscious mother's body. Sydell, supra note 5, at 27. Justin White, a fourteen-year-old
boy whose mother works at an abortion clinic, accepted a ride from two women who then tried to
indoctrinate him about the evils of abortion, telling him that his mother would "die in hell." David
Savage, Abortion Foes Target Doctors for Harassment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at IA.
72. In 1980, there were 2,758 abortion providers across the country; in 1988, that number had
fallen to 2,582. Sydell, supra note 5, at 25. In early 1993, two doctors stopped working at a Melbourne,
Florida, abortion clinic after receiving death threats. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 17. Since Dr.
David Gunn was shot and killed in March 1993, "at least eight more doctors have stopped offering
abortion services." Id.
73. HR. REP. NO. 306, supra note 8, at 8. One all-too-common response to the shortage of
abortion providers is the "circuit rider." When local doctors decide to give up their abortion practices,
clinics search for out-of-town physicians who are willing to spend part of each week on the road. Dr.
LeRoy Carhart is one member of this rare breed of physician, as was Dr. David Gunn. Sandy Banisky,
Abortion 'Circuit Rider' Accepts Risks, ST. LouIs POST-DIsPATCH, Sept. 7, 1993, at 5B.
74. Banisky, supra note 73. On an average day, Dr. Carhart travels from Nebraska to Pittsburgh
by air and then performs 17 abortions in six hours. At night he travels to Ohio, where he performs 21
more abortions in the next two days. Id. When abortion foes burned down Dr. Carhart's barn, killing
17 of his horses, it only steeled his resolve further. "The day our barn burned was the day I decided
'I'm going to do this full time,"' Carhart said. Id.
75. Dr. James Todd, the Executive Vice President of the American Medical Association, testified
in front of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee as to the looming health care crisis:
Due to the growing violence against physicians and health care professionals generally, the
AMA believes that [legislation addressing these concerns would represent] a critical step in
permitting dedicated health care professionals to deliver lawful medical services without fear
of harassment, threats or violence .... Unless the issue of continued violence at health care
facilities is directly confronted, the practice of medicine will be severely affected.
S REP, No. 117, supra note 9, at 16.
Additionally, the number of medical schools requiring abortion training has plummeted to 12%. 139
CONG. REc. E178 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993) (statement of Rep. Lowey). Nearly one-third of obstetrics-
gynecology residency programs do not even offer abortion training. Brookline Clinic Slayings, supra
note 63. In February 1995, the American Council on Graduate Medical Education heard a proposal
requiring mandatory abortion training in obstetrics-gynecology residency programs, with exception for
those residents or institutions which oppose the training on moral or religious grounds. Id.
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beginning to cancel existing policies and to refuse to extend new ones.76
For example, Travelers Insurance, a nationwide company, changed its
underwriting policy in 1990 to exclude abortion clinics.77 Although
insurance industry officials cite purely business reasons, 78 public percep-
tion is surely a consideration in such decisions.79
While abortion foes direct their activities against abortion providers, the
women who depend upon abortion clinics for a full spectrum of health care
services are the real victims. Often, clinics shut down through protest
offered prenatal care and delivery services, childhood immunizations, and
counseling on alternatives to abortion, as well as abortion services.8 Rural
areas are especially vulnerable to attacks by protestors. South Dakota, for
example, has only one abortion provider for the entire state.8' Abortion
foes seek to render whole geographic regions abortion-free, using multiple
concerted attacks in each area for a short period of time.82
The evidence suggests that anti-abortion protestors are meeting their
goals. The availability of abortion services, which is already very limited
in many parts of the United States, is becoming increasingly restricted.83
As one abortion provider who has suffered considerable abuse at the hands
of abortion foes said, "[P]hysicians are discontinuing the provision of a
76. Delia Rios, Some U.S. Insurers Refusing Coverage for Abortion Clinics, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 12, 1993, at A30.
77. Id. "We felt that it was nearly impossible to properly assess or underwrite this type ofbusincss
because of the highly sensitive and unpredictable situations that surround these clinics," said a
spokeswoman for Travelers Insurance. Id.
78. A spokeswoman for Travelers Insurance said that abortion clinics' losses were categorized in
the same manner as medical clinics, and that the decision to cancel abortion clinics' coverage was
"definitely a business decision not based on politics or anything else." Id.
79. An executive at an Illinois insurance company that provides coverage for health professionals
in abortion clinics said, "It only takes one physician to be shot [for those in the insurance industry] to
say, 'Hey, that could have happened to a client or another member of the staff [of a clinic which we
insure]."' Id. A general insurance broker in Montana recalled her company's swift cancellation of a
clinic's insurance when a local newspaper reported a street demonstration at the clinic. Id.
80. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 6. Such was the case at the Blue Mountain Clinic in
Missoula, Montana. An arson fire destroyed the clinic in March 1993, following several years of
blockades and demonstrations. Id. at 5. The clinic served a great number of Medicaid patients who
could not afford prenatal care elsewhere. Id. After the fire, many of the clinic's patients had to travel
an average of 120 miles to find obstetric care. Id. The effects of having to change health care providers
can be serious for women seeking obstetric care or abortion services. Id. at 15-16.
81. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 17 n.29.
82. Id. at 6. In September 1992, fourteen Michigan clinics were attacked with butyric acid within
a two-week period. Similarly, five clinics in San Diego were sprayed with butyric acid on the same day
in March 1993. Id. See supra note 40 for a discussion of the effects of butyric acid attacks.
83. See supra note 72.
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needed medical service simply out of fear." 4
III. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
In addition to state stalking laws, abortion providers have typically
turned to one of three sources for protection: The Federal Access to Crime
Entrances Act (FACE), civil suits under the federal Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and existing state criminal statues.
However, the application of each of these sources to the particular needs
of abortion providers falls short. While FACE, civil RICO, and state
criminal statutes do aid the pro-choice movement as a whole, abortion
providers need protection specifically tailored to their unique situation.
A. The Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act8"
In 1993, members of Congress encountered increasing pressure from
their constituents and from women's rights groups to protect a woman's
right to an abortion. The murder of Dr. David Gunn 6 shocked the nation
and quickly led to a bipartisan call for legislation87 to protect the sanctity
of the abortion right. In November 1993, both the Senate88 and the House
of Representatives voted to approve similar versions of FACE. 9 President
Clinton signed the bill into law in May 1994.90 FACE is aimed primarily
84. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 17 (testimony of Dr. Pablo Rodriquez, the Medical Director
of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, in front of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Services
on May 12, 1993).
85. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248) [hereinafter FACE].
86. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
87. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) sponsored the legislation, compromising with Senator Bob
Smith (R-N.H.) to amend the bill in the Senate. Ana Puga, Senate OK's Bill to Outlaw Abortion Clinic
Blockades, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1993, at 1.
88. The Senate approved FACE by a vote of 69 to 30. Id.
89. The House of Representatives approved FACE by voice vote after Republican opponents to
the bill conceded that there was no point in requiring a roll call vote. Kevin Merrida, House Approves
Bill to Combat Violence at Abortion Clinics, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1993, at Al 1.
90. Ruth Marcus, President Signs Clinic Access Law; Foes File Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 27,
1994, at AI0. FACE provides, in relevant part:
(a) Prohibited activities-Whoever -
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that
person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class
of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully
exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place
of religious worship; or
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at keeping clinic doors free of obstruction9' and preserving a woman's
right to obtain an abortion.' The Act recognizes publicly that a woman's
right to an abortion is constitutionally protected and that the government
will guarantee that right where it is most threatened, at clinic doors.
The main focus of FACE is to protect the viability of clinics.93 The
legislative history of FACE is replete with discussion on how to maintain
physical access to clinics and ensure that clinic services are available to
women.94 While some portions of the legislative record address the
protection of abortion providers,95 FACE provides such protection only if
the person who threatens the provider expresses a specific intent to harm
the provider because of her involvement with abortion services.96 Such a
motive will be nearly impossible to prove, except in situations in which a
violent protestor commits an act of violence against a provider at an
abortion clinic97 or shouts out anti-abortion sentiments while following or
assaulting an abortion provider or her family. Thus, FACE is aimed
primarily at protecting access to clinics-its use for protecting providers
away from those clinics is substantially limited.
An additional problem with FACE is that it draws intense opposition,
including constitutional challenges, from legislators and anti-abortion
groups. Many legislators have challenged FACE from its inception, arguing
that FACE limits the free speech of abortion protestors based on the
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so,
because such facility provides reproductive health services, or intentionally damages or
destroys the property of a place of worship ... shall be subject to [both civil and criminal
penalties].
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 248) (1994).
91. See SEN. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 17-25.
92. Id.
93. "Congress finds that .. women are being denied access to ... vital reproductive health
services ... [and] such conduct subjects women to increased medical risks and thereby jeopardizes the
public health and safety . .. ." 139 CONG. REc. s15,655 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (Congressional
Statement of Findings and Purpose).
94. See generally H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 8; S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9.
95. See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 22.
96. See supra note 90.
97. As of February 1995, Paul Hill, the man who murdered Dr. Britton and his escort in Pensacola,
Florida, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text, is the only person to be convicted under FACE.
The Justice Department has filed one other FACE suit against an Ohio man accused of making death
threats to an abortion provider. Suspect in Abortion Clinic Deaths Indicted, CHI. TRm., Jan. 4, 1995,
at 4. The U.S. Attorney's office is still deciding whether to use FACE against John Salvi, the man who
killed two and injured five in Brookline, Massachusetts Daly, supra note 60, at A3.
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content of their speech.9 Anti-abortion groups also oppose FACE on the
grounds that it violates the constitutionally protected right to practice
peaceful civil disobedience. 99 So far, FACE has been found constitutional-
ly sound."c However, neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuit
courts have addressed these issues.
Perhaps the most frustrating problem with FACE is that police officers
and prosecutors may simply choose not enforce it.'t 1 Federal, state, and
local law enforcement officials have each refused, in some situations, to
enforce the law, claiming that one of the other two police groups has the
primary responsibility to do so."0 2 Similarly, at least one United States
98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 306, supra note 8, at 18-19. "Congress has selected a single point of
view--opposition to abortion-and subjected it to penalties applied to no other point of view." Id.
(quoting Professor McConnell of the University of Chicago School of Law); see also LALRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-3, 12-7 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Nimmer, The Meaning
of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 41 (1973) (noting that a statute
with an overly narrow purpose or interest may create a conclusive presumption that the state interest
advanced by the state is actually an anti-speech interest or objective rather than a nonspeech interest
or objective)).
99. H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 8, at 20-21.
100. See United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 866 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that FACE is
not constitutionally overbroad); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (holding FACE is not constitutionally overbroad or vague); Council for Life Coalition v.
Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that FACE does not violate the First or
Fifth Amendments); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding that FACE does
not violate the First, Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments).
101. Prior to FACE, local police often willfully refused to act in response to anti-abortion violence.
For example, when Sheriff James Hickey of Nueces County, Texas, testified before a House of
Representatives committee studying this problem, Sheriff Hickey stated that "[tihe law of the Supreme
Court . . . that makes it legal to murder babies, is wrong." When directly questioned as to whether he
would enforce the law against those protestors whose conduct violated the law, Sheriff Hickey replied,
"I will not." S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 19. In an attempt to redress such recalcitrant attitudes,
Representative Nita Lowey introduced the Reproductive Freedom Protection Act, H.R. 519, 103d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1993). The Act would require local governments to enforce existing harassment and
disorderly conduct laws against protestors who violated those laws as a condition of their receipt of
federal community development block grant funds. 139 CONG. Rac. E178 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993)
(statement of Rep. Lowey).
Even where local police are willing to enforce laws against anti-abortion protestors, the sheer number
of blockaders can overwhelm small city or rural officials' capacity. Once protestors are arrested, the city
must prosecute all misdemeanor offenses, a time-consuming and expensive process. Finally, the
penalties for violations of most laws imposed upon anti-abortion blockaders are often quite small and
provide little or no deterrent effect. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 9, at 20.
102. In Pensacola, the director of a women's health care clinic tried to have local and federal police
arrest a particularly harassing anti-abortion protestor under FACE. Eisler, supra note 10. Local police
told her that it was the federal marshals' duty to do so, and the federal marshals told her that it was a
matter for local police. Id. That same militant protestor murdered Dr. John Britton six weeks later at
the same clinic. Id. Similar reports of law enforcement officials refusing to prosecute anti-abortion
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Attorney has declined to enforce a federal injunction ordered under
FACE."0 Without the cooperation of enforcement officials, the purpose
of FACE will not be properly effectuated.
B. Civil Use of RICO
In National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,'" the Supreme
Court found that the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) could be used to assess damages against anti-abortion groups
that conspired to shut down abortion clinics.' Abortion rights advocates
hailed this decision as a valuable tool to wield against anti-abortion
protestors, because it allows clinics to recover treble damages"' from
entire anti-abortion organizations if the pro-choice advocates can prove
property damage or business loss at the clinic that directly resulted from a
"pattern of racketeering."'0 7 Huge cash settlements strike fear at the very
heart of groups like Operation Rescue, because they hit anti-abortion
organizations where they are weakest-the pocketbook.)"
Yet the ability of clinics to sue large organizations does not assist the
individual abortion provider. Few individual providers have the financial
wherewithal to sue a large anti-abortion organization under RICO and
prove that it conducts a pattern of racketeering activity. In addition, the
civil nature of the remedy does little for the abortion provider who is
threatened with imminent physical harm.
C. Existing State Criminal Statutes
For many years, states have struggled to address the problem of anti-
abortion protestors who violate the privacy of abortion providers. To
address this problem, states utilize existing criminal laws, such as those that
proscribe harassment to stop overzealous protestors."°9 Other criminal
protestors have surfaced in Mississippi and in Milwaukee. Id.
103. Id.
104. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
105. Id. at 802-03; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
107. See id. § 1961(5). Under RICO, a "pattern" consists of at least two acts of racketeering activity
committed within a ten-year period. Id. This pattern must also evidence a threat of continued criminal
activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
108. See generally Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protestors
-and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1341 (1990).
109. See, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(1) (Supp. 1994) (providing that a person is guilty
of harassment when "he insults, taunts or challenges another person or engages in any other course of
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statutes invoked include those which proscribe menacing,"' loitering,'"t
terrorism," 2 trespassing,"3 and other similar physical crimes."4 How-
ever, to the extent that these statutes require that the provider suffer some
level of physical attack, they do not relieve the provider from harassment
or the threat of attack.
Harassment statutes have proved to be the most effective type of criminal
statute to address problematic anti-abortion behavior. Typical remedies
provided by harassment statutes are temporary restraining orders and
injunctions ordering the protestor to maintain a certain distance from the
provider." 5 Although several courts have upheld the use of harassment
statutes to protect abortion providers and their families from unwanted
attention,116 these statutes are singularly inappropriate for use in the
abortion context. First, harassment statutes allow prosecution on the basis
of mere speech. Thus, abortion foes have challenged and will continue to
challenge these statutes on the grounds that state prosecutors violate
protestors' First Amendment right to free speech by discriminating against
them based on the content of their message.' Second, harassment
statutes are subject to overbreadth and vagueness challenges." 8 Third,
harassment statutes provide only misdemeanor sentencing, "' which is
alarming or distressing conduct in a manner which he knows is likely to provoke a violent or disorderly
response).
I 10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23 (1994) (providing that "a person commits the crime of
menacing if by physical action, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of
imminent serious physical injury").
I 11. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-112 (West 1992) (providing that to loiter means "to
stand idly around, to linger, delay, or wander about, or to remain, abide, or tarry in a public place").
112. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-.28 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37
(1992); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713 (West Supp. 1994).
113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-2-4 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-107-110 (West
Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/21-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); see also State v. Rein,
477 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. CL App. 1991).
114. Other state criminal statutes used to combat staling behaviors include those prohibiting
intimidation, see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-203 (1991), and threatening, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-37 (Supp. 1994).
115. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion on restraining orders.
116. See Welsh v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Harrington,
504 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
117, See, e.g., Welsh, 508 N.W.2d at 216-17 (holding that the grant of a temporary restraining order
prohibiting an abortion protester from contacting a clinic employee under a harassment statute was not
an unconstitutional imposition on the right to free speech).
118. See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of constitutional challenges to
statutes.
119. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.749(2) (Supp. 1994) provides, in relevant part, that "a person who
harasses another... is guilty of a gross misdemeanor."
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unlikely to deter a fervent anti-abortion protestor. Finally, the lenient bail
procedures contained in most harassment statutes usually leave victims of
harassment hesitant to pursue prosecution.
IV. STALKING STATUTES: THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR
PROTECTING ABORTION PROVIDERS
Although state stalking statutes were originally enacted in response to
stalking behavior outside the abortion context, these statutes offer the
particular protections that abortion providers need. Stalking laws enjoy
advantages over FACE, civil RICO, and existing state criminal statutes.
Because stalking laws do not require a specific anti-abortion animus, can
be easily used by individual providers, and provide immediate relief and a
severe punishment. Although constitutional challenges have been made, if
properly drafted, stalking statutes offer an effective means by which
abortion providers can protect themselves and their families.
A. History
Almost all recent state stalking laws trace their creation to the 1989
murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer. 2 ° An obsessed fan haunted
Schaeffer for over two years, finally shooting her at the gate of her Los
Angeles apartment."' Her highly publicized murder took place just before
five other Orange County, California, women were murdered by crazed
former lovers."2 These events combined to inspire California's legislature
to create the nation's first criminal stalking law in 199 0.'2 As other
states became aware of similar situations occurring within their own
borders, their legislatures moved quickly to enact stalking laws. At present,
forty-seven states have enacted stalking laws.'24 The remaining three
120. See Matthew J. Gilligan, Note, Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart Those
Who Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REV. 285 (1992); see also Darrell Dawsey & Eric Malnic, Actress
Rebecca Schaeffer Fatally Shot at Apartment, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at 1.
121. Gilligan, supra note 120, at 285.
122. Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 991, 991 (1993).
123. Gilligan, supra note 120, at 287. For an exceptionally thorough review of stalking laws, their
histories and future, see McAnaney et al., supra note 19.
124. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.260, .270 (Supp. 1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. RV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c (,Vest Supp. 1994);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (Vest Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-90-92 (Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7905 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE
[VOL. 73:635
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss2/9
1995] STALKING LAWS: PROTECTING ABORTION PROVIDERS
states, Arizona, Maine and New York have amended their harassment
statutes to prohibit stalking behavior." In addition, several states have
passed civil stalking laws, which allow damages for pain and suffering to
victims. 126
B. The Mechanics of State Stalking Laws
A core group of states have based their criminal stalking laws on parts
of California's stalking law, developing their statutes around a similar set
of definitions. These states typically define the act of "stalking" to include
"harassing" behavior, a "course of conduct," and "harm to the victim."
"Stalking" is usually defined in these state statutes as willfully, maliciously
and repeatedly following or harassing someone. 27 "Harassing" behavior
is a knowing, willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which
seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or terrorizes the person, and which
serves no legitimate purpose.2 ' A "course of conduct" is a pattern of
ANN. § 35-45-10-1 to -5 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130 - .150 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121B (Supp. 1994); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); MicH. CowP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h, .411i (West
Supp 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-311.03 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 933:3-a (Supp. 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
3A-3 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1
(Supp. 1993); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211-.215 (Anderson Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 103.732 (Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 2709 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-19A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1994); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 56.11 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1061 (1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.1 10 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-
9a (Supp, 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-126, 6-2-506, 7-3-
506-511 (Supp. 1994).
125. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4651 (West
Supp. 1994); N.Y. PENAL § 240.25 (Consol. Supp. 1994).
126. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing people who are stalked to
file civil suits seeking monetary damages when the state's anti-stalking law is violated); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.866 (Supp. 1994) (allowing plaintiffs to recover special and general damages, including damages
for emotional distress, punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs).
127. In California, a stalker is a person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994).
128. Id. § 646.9(d). Stalking statutes are unique in their focus upon the victim's perception of the
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conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose.'29 California also requires that the
"course of conduct" at issue would distress a reasonable person and that it
actually causes substantial distress. 3 The stalker must make a "credible
threat," which means a threat made with the intent and apparent ability to
carry it out so as to cause the victim to reasonably fear for her safety or the
safety of her immediate family.' The victim must suffer some level of
emotional injury, usually that which a reasonable person would suffer.'3 2
Finally, the statutes specifically exclude constitutionally protected
activity;' this exemption is often contained within a statute's general
definition of "harassment."'134
Like the California law, the Florida statute contains a specific exclusion
for some types of picketing and organized protests.'35 Florida's statute
differs from California's, however, the Florida statute distinguishes
"stalking' 36  from "aggravated stalking,"'37  the latter offense being
offensive conduct.
129. See, e.g., id.
130. Id.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1994). Hawaii goes even further, protecting threats
of"damage to the property of the [victim] or another." See HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1 106.5(1)(b) (Supp.
1992).
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1994).
133. California's statute specifically exempts labor picketing. Id. § 646.9(f). Minnesota excepts
behavior that is protected by license, compelled by court order, or that pertains to an employment duty
or valid contract MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (7) (West 1994).
134. For example, California's statute requires that harassment have "no legitimate purpose," CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1994), a clear attempt to exclude constitutionally protected
activity.
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(l)(b) (West Supp. 1994).
136. Id. § 784.048(2),(3). For the purposes of both the stalking and aggravated stalking laws,
"harassing" is defined as "[engaging in] a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes
substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Id. § 784.048(l)(a). A
"course of conduct" is "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." Id. § 784.048(l)(b). "Stalking" is a misdemeanor,
and is defined as "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] or harass[ing] another person." Id.
§ 784.048(2).
137. "Aggravated stalking" is defined as "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing or
harass[ing] another person, and mak[ing] a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury." Id. § 784.048(3). This heightened punishment for aggravated
stalking is intended to break the "endless cycle of misdemeanors that has rendered traditional legal
remedies ineffective against stalking behavior." Guy, supra note 122, at 1005. See ALASKA STAT. §§
11.41.260, .270 (Supp. 1994) for another example of a two-tiered statutory stalking scheme.
Twenty other states provide felony penalties if a restraining order already in place prohibits the
stalker's conduct or if the stalker has been convicted previously for the same offense within a given
time period. See infi'a note 161 for a listing of the fifteen states that provide felony penalties.
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punishable as a felony. The Florida stalking provision requires "substantial
emotional distress" in a victim, but the victim's fear need not be objectively
reasonable.' In contrast, the aggravated stalking provision requires a
reasonable fear from a credible threat.139 Florida's aggravated stalking
provision is broad in scope nonetheless, because it does not require the
stalker to harbor any apparent ability to carry out her threats, an element
present in the California statute."
Virginia's stalking law'4' is significantly broader than California's. The
Virginia statute does not require a credible threat for a stalking convic-
tion.' Virginia also does not require that the victim suffer emotional
injury 4 3 and does not set any time limit upon the pattern of behavior
required."4 In fact, Virginia's law does not define much by way of
substantive law,'45 making it one of the broadest stalking statutes in the
nation.
Some stalking statutes defy categorization. Connecticut's statute,
146
which addresses only literal stalking behaviors, not harassment in general,
is one such statute.'47 Connecticut requires no credible threat; it provides
merely that the stalker must intend to cause the victim to fear for her
physical safety. 41 West Virginia's statute 49 is also unusual because it
is extremely narrow, allowing a stalking charge only if the victim once
resided or engaged in a sexual or intimate relationship with the stalker. 50
C Effectiveness
Several state legislatures and courts have begun to recognize the
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(I)(a) (West Supp. 1994).
139. Id. § 748.048(1)(c). "Credible threat means a threat made with the intent to cause the person
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety." Id.
140. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1994) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e)
(West Supp. 1994).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1994).
142, Id. § 18.2-60.3(A); see also IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1994).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Michie Supp. 1994).
144. Id.
145. Virginia's law states only that "[a]ny person who on more than one occasion engages in
conduct with the intent to place, or with knowledge that the conduct places, that other person in
reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to that other
person's spouse or child shall be guilty of [stalking]." Id.
146. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c (West Supp. 1994).
147. The Connecticut statute outlaws willful and repeated following or lying in wait. Id.
148 Id.
149. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1994).
150, Id. § 61-2-9a(a).
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particular applicability of stalking laws in the abortion context. Both
California and Oregon recently passed legislation enabling stalking victims
to sue their stalkers for pain and suffering.' The sponsor of the Califor-
nia legislation wrote the bill in order to discourage anti-abortion protestors
from threatening providers with bodily harm.5 2 California also eliminated
the fee that courts charge victims who apply for restraining orders against
their stalkers, recognizing that the stalking laws' protections should be
available to all who need it.'53 Judges issuing injunctions to protect
abortion clinic property have already invoked stalking laws in several
instances.'54 In addition, prosecutors in a number of cities either have
utilized the statutes to prosecute abortion protestors for stalking provid-
ers155 or have indicated their willingness to do so.'
Due to their ready adaptability to the abortion protest context, state
stalking laws offer better protection to abortion providers than do FACE,
civil RICO, or existing state criminal statutes. While FACE provides
protection only if a harasser expresses a specific intent to harm the provider
because of her involvement with abortion services, stalking statutes protect
the provider regardless of the reason for the protestor's actions; it is violent
151. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.7 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (Supp. 1994); see
also supra note 126.
152. New Laws Will Aid Stalker Victims, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 30, 1993, at A7.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 546.5(a) (West Supp. 1994).
154. For example, a Minnesota judge ordered a protective zone around each abortion clinic in
anticipation of a massive Operation Rescue protest in July 1993. See At Abortion Clinics, Protect
Women and Speech, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., July 2, 1993, at 16A; see also supra note 47.
155. Florida prosecutors have been quick to utilize their state stalking law against anti-abortion
providers. The first abortion protestor to be arrested under the stalking law was prosecuted and
convicted, but was only given probation. He soon violated his probation by demonstrating at the clinic
where his victim worked. Stalker Is Accused of Violating Probation, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 23, 1993,
at 5B.
In South Carolina, prosecutors charged Cathy Ann Rider under an anti-stalking law after she was
accused of telling an abortion clinic director that the director "might be next" to be shot. Maria Puente,
Clinic Protestors Under Pressure from Stalking Laws, USA TODAY, May 10, 1993, at 2A.
Prosecutors charged Brian Oates under Minnesota's anti-stalking statute after he was arrested in June
1993 for repeatedly following a volunteer guard at a local abortion clinic. Tatsha Robertson, Abortion
Foes Say Stalking Law Is Not Constitutional, MINNFAOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 21, 1993, at lB.
An Omaha judge dismissed a stalking charge filed by an abortion provider against anti-abortion
activist Sharon McKee after the judge found that the complaint had not been specific enough under the
conduct requirements. Judge Dismisses Doctor's Stalking Charges, American Political Network, Nov.
1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File. See supra notes 124-31 and
accompanying text for a discussion of stalking statute conduct requirements.
156. For example, the Cook County, Illinois State's Attorney "will not hesitate to use" the stalking
laws if a health facility worker receives a credible threat. William Reck-tenwald, Stalking Law May Be
Used on Abortion Protestors, CHI. TRW., Mar. 20, 1993, at 11.
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behavior itself that is proscribed. This focus on conduct allows providers
to rely on stalking statutes for protection against a wider range of
antagonistic behavior. Furthermore, local police can use state stalking
statutes to act swiftly to aid abortion providers in danger, whereas FACE
requires additional coordination between federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials.
Similarly, stalking statutes offer more immediate physical protection than
does civil RICO. While civil RICO offers a monetary remedy to prosperous
clinics that can afford to pursue anti-abortion organizations in protracted
litigation, this remedy is not an effective solution to existing harassment.
By contrast, stalking statutes offer individual providers immediate physical
protection through the use of imminent arrest procedures157 and temporary
restraining orders. 5
State stalking laws also enjoy several advantages over state criminal
statutes. First, giving providers a specific remedy separate from other
criminal statutes is an important step toward keeping abortion providers in
their profession. A specific statutory recognition of the abuse that the
provider encounters legitimizes her feelings and fears. Anti-stalking laws
offer abortion providers the satisfaction of realizing that they are the
subjects of a new and terrifying type of crime and that they are not alone
in their predicament. The existence and enforcement of stalking laws
against anti-abortion protestors recognizes that harassing acts against
providers are more than impassioned, they are criminal.'59
Second, stalking laws provide more stringent penalties than do other
criminal laws that prohibit similar behavior. Many states now recognize that
stalking deserves a harsher penalty than those provided for by existing
crimes like harassment. Accordingly, a number of states have implemented
graduated sentencing schemes for stalking."s Fifteen states presently
157. Under most criminal statutes, a police officer cannot arrest a stalking suspect until an actual
attack takes place. With a stalking statute in place, however, a police officer can arrest a stalker who
threatens to attack a victim. Therefore, stalking statutes allow for the imminent arrest of potential
attackers. See Gilligan, supra note 120, at 301.
158. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
159. "[A]nti-stalking laws recognize that actions as seemingly innocent as 'following,' when done
repeatedly [sic] and when targeted at an individual, generate fear and warrant prosecution." McAnaney
et al., supra note 19, at 890.
160. Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines Commission recently increased the recommended sentence
for felony stalking. The Commission raised penalties for repeated phone calls and repeated violations
of stalking laws up to the same level as crimes such as third-degree assault and motor vehicle theft.
Kevin Duchschere, Sentencing Commission Urges Stiffer Stalking Penalties, MINNEAPOLIS STAR Tam.,
Oct. 22, 1993, at 7B.
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impose felony penalties for aggravated stalking behavior.161
Finally, stalking laws provide better immediate protection for the
endangered provider than do other state criminal statutes. Because stalking
laws enable the victim to seek early and effective law enforcement before
an attack actually takes place, the statutes offer greater protection than other
criminal statutes that require a physical contact or assault to occur before
police action can be taken. Temporary restraining orders are always
available in conjunction with stalking statutes, and a few states are now
speeding up the use of restraining orders by making sure that each police
officer and judge has sentencing information when she needs it.' 61
Temporary restraining orders used in conjunction with existing criminal
statutes have been criticized as ineffective remedies for stalking behavior;
statistics show that many orders are simply ignored.163 However, stalking
statutes address this weakness in the system by providing additional
statutory protections for the victim. Different stalking statutes have different
protections: Iowa presumes stalkers are ineligible for bail,"6 Arkansas
requires the court to enter a protective order upon the pretrial release of the
stalker,1 65 and both Texas and Washington require state authorities to
161. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.260(c) (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53-181c(b) (West
Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(3) (West
Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(c) (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, par. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. § 508.140(2) (Baldwin 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.04 (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(b)
(1993); Outo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (Supp.
1995); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-2(b) (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-2 (Supp.
1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(b)(2) (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1063 (1993).
162. Massachusetts is an example of a state constantly seeking to better serve those stalking victims
seeking temporary restraining orders. Last year, Massachusetts implemented a computerized database,
present in every courtroom, listing temporary restraining orders and the circumstances under which they
were given. Gilligan, supra note 120, at 336 n.347. This court reform was prompted by the tragic death
of Boston resident Kristin Lardner, who was killed after her ex-boyfiiend was released from arrest
despite the existence of several restraining orders against him. McAnaney et al., supra note 19, at 875
n.277.
Colorado is another state searching for new ways to better protect stalking victims. Colorado puts
electronic bracelets on stalkers to warn former victims and police of a temporary restraining order
violation. Gilligan, supra note 120, at 336 n.347.
Minnesota also attempted to speed up the use of restraining orders by reforming its treatment of
stalking as a crime. First, all police officers receive training about crimes of violence before being
licensed as peace officers. Id. § 626.8451 (West Supp. 1994). Second, district court judges are trained
on stalking issues. Id. § 480.30.
163. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
164. IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1(3) (West Supp. 1994).
165. AmK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
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notify the victim upon the stalker's release or escape from prison. 66
Furthermore, in states with strong stalking laws, a victim does not even
need an injunction to get immediate protection, for once the stalker
commits the requisite criminal acts, the police have the authority to arrest
the stalker.
D. Constitutional Challenges to Stalking Laws
For stalking laws to be effective, they must withstand constitutional
scrutiny. When defendants challenge stalking laws, their challenges are
usually based on two grounds: overbreadth t67 and vagueness.16
1. Overbreadth
To survive challenges for overbreadth,'69 statutes must not criminalize
innocent behavior or behavior otherwise protected by the Constitution 70
The primary harm that legislatures must avoid in drafting stalking statutes
is the "chilling effect"' an overbroad statute may have upon citizens'
constitutionally protected behavior. That is, people might refrain from
engaging in innocent conduct if they fear arrest. The Supreme Court's
standard for overbreadth is that "a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities ... may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms."
172
In the past, when constitutionally protected rights were burdened by a
statute suspected to be overbroad, the Supreme Court automatically applied
166. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.11 (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A,155 (West Supp. 1994).
167. See generally Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In Coates, the Court
invalidated a statute prohibiting "three or more persons to assemble ... and ... conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by .... Id. at 611. The Court noted that such a broad law
would prohibit peoples' right to gather in public for legitimate reasons. Some individuals would be
inhibited from exercising their constitutionally protected rights of free assembly and association. Id. at
615.
168. See id. at 614. The Coates Court also found the Cincinnati bylaw vague because the term
"annoying" was too ambiguous. Id.
169. For a general discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrTIONAL
LAW, 1191-1202 (12th ed. 1991).
170. Closely protected constitutional rights include freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and
the right to assemble. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
171. See GUNTHER, supra note 169, at 1202.
172. Gilligan, supra note 120, at 306 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288,
307 (1964)).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
"strict scrutiny" and forced a state or city to prove that it had a compelling
governmental interest and that the means used to achieve that interest were
necessary. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has relaxed its
standard of review to a "substantial overbreadth" test, which asks whether
the law challenged reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct, not whether it reaches any protected conduct at all."'
Two overbreadth arguments have been made with respect to stalking
statutes. First, challengers allege that stalking statutes infringe upon a
protestor's right of mobility, a right that the Supreme Court has long
protected. 74 Second, because most stalking laws define stalking as a
pattern of specific conduct 75 that may include speech, challengers argue
that stalking statutes are substantially overbroad in their proscriptions of
speech. 76
To avoid such overbreadth challenges in the future, state legislators can
use several methods in carefully drafting their stalking statutes. First,
legislators can specifically exempt constitutionally protected activities from
the statute's coverage. By explicitly excluding otherwise constitutional
behavior from a stalking law's definition of "stalking" or "harassment,"
state legislatures can reduce the possibility that the statute chills that
constitutional right. For example, Florida's statute provides that
"[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of
'course of conduct.' Such constitutionally protected activity includes
picketing and other organized protests.'" Many stalking statutes current-
ly in effect contain similar provisions.1 78
173. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffinan Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494 (1982).
174. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 163-64 (1972). In Papachristou, the Supreme Court struck down a state vagrancy law as overbroad
because it prohibited such plebeian behaviors as walking or strolling without purpose, which the Court
said were worthy of constitutional protection. Id.
175. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text for California's statutory definition of "course
of conduct."
176. See Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding state stalking statute
against overbreadth challenge to statute's potential application to speech as prohibited conduct);
Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting overbreadth challenge to
state stalking statute, holding that any application of the statute to speech was insubstantial).
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(l)(b) (West Supp. 1994).
178. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229(dXI)(B) (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 1708.7(e) (West Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-1 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.749(7) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(10) (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.575(5)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506(c) (Supp. 1994).
Some states attempt to exempt protected activity by including only the phrase "with no legitimate
purpose." See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.732(l) (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a) (Supp.
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A second method by which to avoid an overbreadth challenge is to
define stalking in clear and recognizable terms, e.g., as conduct that would
cause substantial harm to a "reasonable person."'179 In requiring a certain
level of harm as perceived by a certain type of victim, the statute limits
only that conduct that is easily recognizable and easily identifiable.18 °
Thus, state legislatures can narrowly craft their stalking statutes to avoid
constitutional challenges for overbreadth. 8'
2. Vagueness
A stalking statute may also violate constitutional guarantees if its terms
are overly vague. The vagueness doctrine'82 encompasses two Due
Process Clause8 3 guarantees: (1) the average citizen should be able to
understand what conduct is proscribed by a given law, and (2) definite
legislative standards should restrain government officials from arbitrary or
discriminatory use of the statute. 84 Thus, stalking statutes must outlaw
conduct with enough detail that citizens of ordinary intelligence can
understand what is legal and what is not. 8 Legislators must also set out
clear guidelines that will require police, prosecutors, and juries to enforce
the statutes consistently. 8 6
Due to the very nature of those behaviors prohibited under stalking laws,
however, it is difficult for legislators to predict exactly what types of
specific situations will arise in violation of the statutes. Indeed, for a
legislature to draft a stalking statute narrowly to proscribe only one
1994); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 711-1 106.5(1)(a) (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a) (Supp.
1993)o
179. See People v. Harvey, 123 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1954) (upholding a statute because it required
"substantial interference with ... the reasonable man").
180. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994) for an example of a stalking statute that
requires emotional distress. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1994) for an example of a
stalking statute that requires a victim's fear to be reasonable.
181. In fact, most stalking statutes have been upheld in the face of overbreadth challenges, see, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Brian William Oates, No. 93042334, slip op. at 26 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 1993); State v.
Tremmel, 664 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1994).
182. For a general discussion of the vagueness doctrine, see TRIBE, supra note 98, § 12-31.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972) (holding that a law that
proscribes wandering about "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts, and
that the "amenities of life as we have known them" deserve constitutional protection).
185. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1926). A statute is void for
vagueness if men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. Id.
186. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (invalidating an anti-loitering statute on
grounds that the statute provided no standard for determining how to satisfy its requirements).
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situation or behavior would defeat the purpose of the statute-to adapt its
proscriptions to fit a variety of circumstances. t87 Fortunately, the Supreme
Court recognized this paradox and held that the Constitution does not
require total specificity in statutory language.
1 88
Nonetheless, to create stalking statutes that will survive challenges for
vagueness, state legislators must walk a fine line. The statute must be
specific enough for the ordinary citizen to know with clarity which
behaviors are prohibited, yet broad enough to encompass a variety of
behaviors. State legislators can help to protect their stalking statutes against
vagueness challenges by including the element of scienter or intent.
8 9
The Supreme Court has held that a "scienter requirement may mitigate a
law's vagueness." 90 Many existing stalking statutes include a knowledge
requirement, and that element appears to have made them resistant to
vagueness challenges: courts have upheld such tightly drawn statutes over
constitutional challenges. t9 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the problem of overzealous anti-abortion protestors is
extremely complex, and no one statute can solve all providers' problems.
Many fine remedies exist for defusing the peculiar and dangerous situations
that can result when anti-abortion activists exceed the legal boundaries of
protest. 92 If used together, these remedies can curb provider abuse and
clinic harassment on many fronts. Some, such as civil RICO, are well-
suited to dealing with large organizations like Operation Rescue at the
187. See TRIBE, supra note 98, at 1011-22, for a discussion of the dangers of drafting statutes
narrowly.
188. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
189. Scienter is defined as "knowingly." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990). This
requirement that a person act knowingly is distinguishable from the intent requirement that makes
FACE troublesome. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Under California's stalking statute
and many others, a person must have "intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her
safety." CAL. CVAL. CODE § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1994). Under FACE, a person must
"intentionally injureD... any person ... because that person... is obtaining or providing reproductive
health services." 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(a)(1) (1994). Therefore, a scienter requirement is content-neutral
and easier to prove than FACE's specific requirement of proving anti-abortion sentiment.
190. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. Accord Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337 (1952) (acting "knowingly"); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (acting "willfully"); State
v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1981) (acting "purposely"); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d
803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (acting "intentionally").
191. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 26-62 and accompanying text.
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corporate level. 9 Others, like FACE, are most effective to guard the
sanctity of the clinic itself, to keep clinic doors open and free of illegal
blockade.19' Still others, like the various criminal statutes already used to
stop similar criminal behavior,"9 ' are most effective as default protections
for the abortion provider. Nonetheless, stalking laws are the best means by
which to handle the specific harassment and threats of violence that
abortion providers encounter from anti-abortion protestors. First, and most
important, state stalking statutes offer immediate and effective physical
protection to vulnerable abortion providers.'96 Law enforcement authori-
ties and courts can respond quickly to threatened acts of violence before the
violence actually occurs. Second, stalking statutes offer extended protection
to individual abortion providers because they contain heavy misdemeanor
sentences, graduated sentencing schemes, and felony sentences for
aggravated stalkers. 9 Third, the bail procedures in many stalking statutes
are "victim-friendly," requiring police officials to notify former stalking
victims before their former stalkers are released from police custody.198
Finally, although stalking laws are subject to constitutional challenge,
legislators can overcome these challenges through narrow drafting and
exemption of constitutionally protected activities. 99 All states that
currently have or are considering enacting stalking laws should use those
laws to prosecute anti-abortion protestors who exceed the constitutionally
protected limits of protest and intrude into abortion providers' private lives.
The abortion provider today is not safe anywhere, solely due to his or
her choice to help women exercise their constitutionally guaranteed right
to an abortion. Anti-abortion activists like John Burt, the regional director
of Rescue America, have laid down the gauntlet. "I think it's going to be
like a war, a holy war, and people are going to get hurt on both sides."'
These threats have deterred some abortion providers, but many dedicated
doctors and clinicians continue their work despite violence directed at
themselves and their families. In the critical effort to keep abortion
providers alive and well, no state can afford to ignore the effectiveness of
stalking statutes. State stalking statutes may be the last, best weapons in the
193. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
194, See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 177-81, 189-91 and accompanying text.
200. Nightline, supra note 1.
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arsenal. Anti-abortion protestors may have won some initial battles, but
they have not yet won the war.
Amy M. Sneirson
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss2/9
